The Park Place Economist
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 8

5-1993

Factors Influencing Employment in the U.S. Automobile Industry
Paul S. Davies '92

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace

Recommended Citation
Davies '92, Paul S. (1993) "Factors Influencing Employment in the U.S. Automobile
Industry," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 1
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol1/iss1/8
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Factors Influencing Employment in the U.S. Automobile Industry
Abstract
Section I will present a brief historical overview of the U.S. auto industry since the 1960s. Section II will
discuss the theoretical arguments behind each of the four employment influencing areas mentioned
earlier. The empirical model based on this theoretical discussion will be presented in Section III, with the
results being given in Section IV. Finally, Section V will draw some conclusions and make some
suggestions for future research.

This article is available in The Park Place Economist: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol1/iss1/8

Factors Influencing Employment in the
U.S. Automobile Industry
by Paul S. Davies
During the 1980s, increased attention was paid by the United
Auto Workers union and politicians to the U.S. automobile
industry and the problems it was facing from Japanese
competition. Now, with 1992 being a presidential election year,
the candidates are continuing to draw attention to what they see
as the problems of the U.S. auto industry. And this concern is
not without reason. The share of the U.S. market held by the Big
Three domestic producers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler), has decreased
dramatically over the past three decades. As is shown in Figure
1, the market share of U.S. based producers has fallen from a
high of 95.11% in 1962, to around 82% in the mid-1970s, to a low
of around 64% in 1987 (MVMA World Motor Vehicle Data, 1990).
These figures become even more alarming if we look at the market
share of foreign transplants (i.e.-foreign auto production plant
in the U.S.) and imports taken together. They accounted for 41%
of the market in 1990 (Singleton, 1992, p.22).
The problems of the Big Three can also be seen in the
generally declining levels of employment over the past 10 to 15
years (see Figure 2 ) . From a peak level of 1,004,900 employees
in 1978, employment fell to a low of 704,800 in 1982, and is now
just above 800,000 employees (Monthly Labor Review, various
issues). The purpose of this paper, then, is to explain these
drastic fluctuations in auto industry employment from 1960
through 1990. Both theoretical and empirical analysis are used
to test several demand-side hypotheses about these changing
employment levels. Specifically, employment is hypothesized to
be influenced by 1) the level of international competition, 2)
the extent of union (UAW) power, 3) the implementation of labor
saving and productivity-enhancing technologies, and 4)
outsourcing arrangements of the Big Three. Changes in these four
areas can be shown to shift or change the elasticity of the
demand curve for labor in the automobile industry.
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows: Section I
will present a brief historical overview of the U.S. auto
industry since the 1960s. Section II will discuss the
theoretical arguments behind each of the four employment
influencing areas mentioned earlier. The empirical model based
on this theoretical discussion will be presented in Section III,
with the results being given in Section IV. Finally, Section V
will draw some conclusions and make some suggestions for future
research.
I.

THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the late 1960s, the U.S. auto industry was very different
from what it is now. The Big Three (GM, Ford, Chrysler)
dominated the U.S. market for automobiles, facing very minimal
Illinois Wesleyan University
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foreign competition (Singleton, 1992, p.18). Only Volkswagen was
competing in the U.S. market, allowing U.S. producers to capture
between 90 and 95% of the market for the majority of the decade.
Practically 100% of the employees in the industry were members of
the United Auto Workers (UAW), giving the union a large degree of
"monopoly power" (i.e.—the ability to maintain wages above
Figure 1

MARKET SHARE
U.S. Based Automobile Producers

100-

9590s*m+

2

1
CO

**
9

1
2

8580757065
60
1960 ' 1964 • 1968 ' 1972 ' 1976 ' 1980 ' 1984 ' 1988
"
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
Year

Figure 2

EMPLOYMENT LEVEL
U.S. SIC 371

600

\ ' < rial ' !• **.X ' I J-.1 i ' ' 'I i i i i i i i i -i—r-r
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
Year

42

The Park Place Economist/Spring 1993

equilibrium along a relatively inelastic demand curve for labor).
Because the industry was highly concentrated with the Big Three
controlling almost the entire market, they could accept these
higher wage demands and more strict work rules, passing the higher labor costs along to consumers in the form of higher product
prices (i.e.—the product demand curve was relatively inelastic).
In other words, the lack of competition allowed the Big Three to
maintain automobile prices high enough to guarantee profitability, even in the face of high union labor costs.
However, things started to change in the early 1970s with
the first oil shock in 1973. OPEC restricted the supply of crude
oil, causing the price of oil and gasoline to skyrocket. Consumer
preferences began to shift toward smaller, more fuel efficient
automobiles which were not offered by the Big Three (Singleton,
1992, p.19). Enter Japan. Offering a line of smaller, lower
cost, fuel efficient cars and relying on a new image of technical
excellence and high product quality, the Japanese began taking
larger and larger parts of the U.S. market from the Big Three
(Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1986, p.197). This trend accelerated
through the 1970s, with the Japanese increasing their market
share from 7.6% in 1969 to 22.7% after the second oil shock of
1979.
As the Big Three tried to catch up in the production of
small, fuel efficient cars, they began working against their
comparative advantage in the production of large cars. Incurring
high product development and design costs for this new line of
small cars, the profits of the Big Three started to shrink. Labor
costs (as well as the costs of other inputs) therefore became
more of an issue as the Big Three tried to maintain profits and
market share. With the competition from Japan becoming more
intense, the latest in manufacturing technologies were being
adopted "to raise productivity, lower costs, and improve quality"
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985).
The auto industry by the 1980s had emerged as a more
competitive industry, very different from the highly concentrated
industry of the 1960s. The high union labor costs could no
longer be passed on to consumers, so employment began to fall and
plant closings were threatened. A period of concessionary
bargaining began in the early 1980s as the UAW scrambled to save
the jobs of its members.
More recently, U.S. producers have been increasingly moving
toward outside suppliers of parts and components—nonunion
suppliers in many cases—to take advantage of lower labor costs.
Moves to Mexico by many parts suppliers have become reality
rather than just threats, jeopardizing the jobs of many U.S.
workers. New outsourcing arrangements for parts have become more
and more important as U.S. auto producers strive to match the
Japanese.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
From the overview presented above, four important areas
Illinois Wesleyan University
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emerge as being strong influences on employment in the U.S. auto
industry: 1) international competition, 2) union power, 3)
technological change, and 4) outsourcing arrangements. The
following discussion illustrates how changes in these areas will
theoretically effect the demand for labor in the auto industry.
Changes in these areas are shown to either shift or change
the elasticity of the demand curve. Basic demand theory is used
to illustrate shifts in the demand curve, while the Hicks
Marshall Laws of Derived Demand are used to explain changes in
the elasticity of demand for labor. These laws state that the
wage elasticity of demand for a particular category of labor will
be high under the following circumstances:
"1) when the price elasticity of demand for the product
being produced is high;
2) when other factors of production can be easily substituted
for the category of labor;
3) when the supply of other factors of production is highly
elastic...; and
4) when the cost of employing the category of labor is a
large share of the total costs of production" (Ehrenberg and
Smith, 1991, p.109).
It is important to note here that the four areas under
consideration as determinants of employment are all demand-side
variables. The following arguments are made under the assumption
that the supply of labor curve in the auto industry is upward
sloping and held constant. Because the UAW is a trade union
rather than a craft union, it cannot restrict the supply of labor
in the industry. The auto makers are assumed to be able to hire
the demanded quantity of labor at the negotiated wage rate and to
be able to adjust the quantity of labor employed as market
conditions change. In other words, ignoring the supply side of
the labor market as a determinant of employment seems reasonable
because the negotiated wage is, no doubt, above equilibrium. Evidence of this is persistent unemployment (i.e. excess supply) in
the industry as well as the fact that the ratio of auto
worker-to-total manufacturing wages is greater than one (see
Cline, 1986). Therefore, employment is determined by equating
the wage to the demand for labor curve. Workers will always be
available at union-scale wages, so supply considerations are not
important.
International Competition
As can be seen from the discussion in Section I and the
graph of U.S. market share presented in Figure 1, the structure
of the auto industry has changed dramatically since the 1960s.
Whereas there were only three major competitors (GM, Ford,
Chrysler) in the U.S. market in the 1960s, controlling up to 95%
of the market, there are now at least ten strong competitors.
Only three of these competitors are U.S. corporations (the Big
Three), with foreign auto makers having taken over 35% of the
market by the late 1980s (see Figure 1 ) .
44
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The high concentration of the industry in the 1960s and
early 1970s, along with the nature of the product market, is
indicative of the monopolistically competitive market structure,
which lies between monopoly and perfect competition. With this
type of market structure, the producers are able to set their
prices above the intersection of the marginal cost and marginal
revenue curves, say at P (see Figure 3A) . In this situation,
the Big Three were able to acquiesce to the UAW's demand for
higher wages and stricter work rules because these higher labor
costs could be passed on to consumers in the form of higher
product prices. That is, the high profits earned by the Big
Three (shown as the area of P0ABC in Fig. 3A) made room for wage
increases to union workers.

FIGURE 3
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However, as Japanese firms began to enter the U.S. market
with the oil shocks of the 1970s, the situation facing the Big
Three began to change. With more competitors in the market, the
monopolistic competition model would predict that two things
should happen. First, the product demand curve for each of the
Big Three firms should shift to the left as they will be able to
sell fewer automobiles at any given price (see Figure 3B).
Second, the product demand curve facing each firm should also
become more elastic as more and more automobiles are available
for consumers to choose from. The demand for automobiles will
before sensitive to price changes due to the increased options of
consumers. The new demand curve will look like D' in Figure 3B
(see Varian, 1986 for a more complete discussion of monopolistic
competition).
Big Three producers will now only be able to charge P1 for
their output due to the increased competition from Japanese
firms. Profits will be squeezed (area of PjA'B'C in Fig. 3B) as
firms move toward zero long run economic profits (Varian, 1986,
p.438). Labor demands for high wages can no longer be as readily
accepted as in the 1960s and early 1970s if the Big Three firms
want to maintain their market share.
The effects of this change of market composition on demand
for labor will be as follows: First the demand curve for labor
facing U.S. producers will shift left in response to the leftward
shift in product demand (remember, labor demand is derived from
product demand)• Second, the demand for labor curve will become
more elastic according to the first of the Hicks-Marshall Laws of
Derived Demand. Overall, then, the increase in international
competition that began in the early 1970s and has continued
through the present should cause employment in the auto industry
to fall and become more sensitive to changes in wage and benefit
demands by the UAW. Certainly, this relationship seems plausible
from a quick analysis of Figures 1 and 2. It will be empirically
tested later in the paper.
Union Power
The United Auto Workers (UAW) union has historically been
very strong in the U.S. auto industry (at least back to 1960, the
beginning point of this study). Although the UAW enjoys very
cooperative relations with management these days, "its clout—at
the bargaining table and in the political arena—is waning"
(Lowell, 1985, p.l). This loss of power can be seen by looking
at four areas: unionization rates, real wages, pattern
bargaining, and domestic content.
The level of unionization by the UAW has been decreasing
recently. UAW membership was at 1.2 million in 1985, with
automotive hourly employees accounting for 587,307 members. This
figure represents a 22.5% decrease from 757,328 automotive members just ten years earlier in 1975 (Lowell, Sept. 1985, p.2).
Furthermore, Japanese transplants in the U.S. (with the exception
46
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of the Mitsubishi plant in Bloomington/Normal, IL) have been very
reluctant to even recognize the UAW as a bargaining agent
(Lowell, 1985, p . 5 ) . Although this reflects a choice by
employees rather than by the employer, it still represents a general trend away from the power that the UAW once held in the U.S.
auto industry. This loss of union power can also be seen by
looking at Figure 4. Over the past six to eight years, union
wages have failed to keep pace with inflation, having decreased
rather steadily since 1984. And in the early 1980s, the UAW was
forced to abandon its goal of high wages during the period of
concessionary bargaining in order to save jobs (Ready, 1980,
p.272).

Figure 4
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Pattern bargaining is a more difficult issue, however.
While pattern bargaining during the 1960s and 1970s strongly
influenced settlements in general, the 1980s saw wage settlements
that varied across firms and that were driven by increased
competitive pressures (Ready, 1990, p.272). The auto industry's
pattern bargaining took the form of wage leadership, where one of
the Big Three would settle with the UAW and then the other two
would fall in line. While Ready (1990) argues that pattern
bargaining in general increased over the 1977-1983 period, she
concedes that the auto industry was a strong exception to this
trend. Interestingly enough, an examination of the 1987 and 1990
contracts between the Big Three and the UAW seems to show a
return to pattern bargaining (Monthly Labor Review, various
issues). In 1987, Ford settled first, and in 1990 GM settled
first, but the language and provisions of the others closely
Illinois Wesleyan University
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paralleled the leader's contract in both years. What exactly
this means in terms of union power, I am not sure, but it may be
a reflection of the more cooperative union-management relations
alluded to earlier.
Finally, the decrease in union power can be shown by the
increasing amounts of foreign parts in U.S. produced cars. This
will be covered later, but it is useful to point out here that
non-U.S. suppliers are expected to provide 36% of auto components
in 1990 (Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1986, p.204). These new outsourcing arrangements put the jobs of up to 70,000 UAW members in
jeopardy (Sorge, 1991, p.20).
Overall, then, it would seem that the UAW has been losing
some of its "monopoly power" over the past ten to fifteen years.
As union monopoly power generally results in a more inelastic
demand for labor curve, allowing for wage increases with small
reductions in employment, this loss of monopoly power by the UAW
should result in a more elastic demand for labor curve (Davies,
1991, p.3). The effect on employment of this more elastic demand
for labor curve should be negative, as employment is now more
sensitive to increased wage and benefit demands by the UAW.
Technology
The intense competition from Japanese auto makers has been
causing U.S. auto makers to make many changes, one of which
involves the implementation of new technologies. Industrial
robots, computers, and programmable controllers are all being
used to a greater extent by the Big Three these days in efforts
to raise productivity and quality and to reduce costs.
Ultimately, these changes will affect the level of employment in
the U.S. auto industry. But will new technologies serve to
reduce employment (substitution effect) or increase employment
(scale effect)?
The substitution effect is probably the more common of the
two when thinking about capital-for-labor substitutions. This
effect will be negative according to the second Law of Derived
Demand; that is, an increase in technology implementation will
reduce employment. Capital and labor are substitutes in the production process. In the auto industry, this effect can be seen in
the fact that new technologies generally replace certain types or
categories of workers. For example, computer-aided design and
manufacturing (CAD/CAM) systems tend to "reduce unit labor
requirements for engineers, drafters, machine operators, and
tool-and-die makers" (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985, p.37).
Similarly, industrial robots are said to perform the work of
about 1.5 workers per shift for spot welding, and of one worker
per shift for materials handling (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1985, p.36). According to one study (Allen, 1987), the principal
motivation for robotic welding is labor savings.
Of course, while some categories of workers will be
displaced by the use of new technologies, there will also be new
jobs associated with these technologies. These new jobs will
48
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primarily be in skilled areas such as maintenance, programming,
and electrical control (Allen, 1987, p.91). Although his study
is somewhat dated, Allen (1987) predicted a loss of 73,200
unskilled jobs and a gain of 6200 skilled jobs due to robots
alone by 1990 (no current numbers were available to confirm this
prediction). This would amount to an overall net loss of 67,000
jobs, illustrating the negative effects on employment of capital
for-labor substitutions.
The opposite effect, the scale effect, would predict an
increase in employment due to technology implementation. The
scale effect in the auto industry would work as follows: The
implementation of new technologies will increase the productivity
(output per hour) of employees. Fewer units of labor will be required to produce the same amount of output. This will result in
lower product prices and, according to basic demand theory, a
higher quantity of automobiles demanded. Consequently, the
demand for labor will increase because it is derived from the
demand for automobiles (see Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991 for a more
complete discussion of the scale effect).
Whether the substitution effect or the scale effect will
dominate cannot be known from theoretical discussion alone. But
labor theory does give us some idea about conditions under which
capital and labor are likely to be gross substitutes based on the
Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived Demand (i.e.—conditions under
which the substitution effect dominates the scale effect):
1) the substitution effect will be stronger to the extent
that capital is a substitute for labor in the production process
and that it is relatively easy for firms to make the
substitution; and
2) the scale effect will be relatively weak if there is an
inelastic product demand and if capital constitutes a small share
of total cost in the industry experiencing automation (Ehrenberg
and Smith, 1991, p.125).
These conditions suggest that both the substitution and
scale effects may be strong in the auto industry. Condition 1
seems to hold based on the labor displacement estimates due to
robotics given above, pointing to a strong substitution effect.
However, condition 2 does not hold for the auto industry, as
product demand is relatively elastic (sensitive to fluctuations
in price) and capital would appear to constitute a relatively
large share of total cost in the industry. This points to a
strong scale effect as well.
Theoretically, then, we cannot predict whether the
substitution or scale effect will dominate in the auto industry.
The answer to this question is left to the empirical model
developed in the next section. Certainly, though, the argument
that new technologies will affect employment is theoretically
sound, regardless of the direction of the change.
Outsourcing
The issue of outsourcing (i.e.—auto producers going outside
Illinois Wesleyan University
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the company and many times outside the country for parts) has
been hotly debated over the past ten years. From the employer's
perspective, it makes perfect sense to go outside the company and
get the same parts for $10 an hour in labor costs instead of the
$27 an hour that UAW workers get (Smith, 1989). But from the
viewpoint of the auto workers and the UAW, these new outsourcing
arrangements put jobs at stake—the jobs of up to 70,000 UAW
members, to be more precise (Sorge, 1991, p.20)„
Although recent union contracts have beefed-up income
protection packages for laid-off workers and restrictions on
outsourcing (Cimini, 1991, p.20), outsourcing by the Big Three
either to non-union suppliers or to over-seas suppliers will
reduce the demand for labor in the industry. Essentially, the use
of foreign-built parts reduces domestic employment by
transferring demand abroad. Imports of auto parts by the Big
Three rose from $2.7 billion in 1982 to $5.6 billion in 1986
(Singleton, 1992, p.26). Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986) estimated
that non-U.S. suppliers would provide 36% of auto components by
1990, up from 26% in 1985 (current figures were not available to
confirm this forecast).
Another effect outsourcing could have on the demand for
labor is to increase the elasticity of the demand curve.
According to the second of the Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived
Demand, the elasticity of demand for auto workers will be high
"when other factors of production can be easily substituted" for
auto workers (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991, p.109). The
substitution taking place in the case of outsourcing would be one
of non-union labor for union labor or unskilled for skilled labor
as auto makers increasingly move toward foreign suppliers for
parts and components. As this substitution takes place,
employment in the auto industry becomes much more sensitive to
changes in the wage rate.
To the extent that the demand curve for labor shifts to the
left and becomes more elastic as outsourcing by the Big Three
increases, employment may be drastically reduced. However, if
either of these changes occurs independently, employment should
still be reduced, albeit by a smaller amount.
III. Empirical Model
The theoretical discussion above highlights four hypotheses
concerning the demand for employment in the U.S. auto industry:
1) changes in the share of the U.S. market held by domestic
producers are hypothesized to directly affect the demand
for labor in the industry;
2) changes in the power of the UAW are hypothesized to
inversely affect the demand for labor;
3) changes in technology implementation will affect labor
demand either negatively (if the substitution effect
prevails), or positively (if the scale effect prevails);
4) changes in outsourcing arrangements should
inversely affect the demand for labor in the U.S. auto
50
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industry.
These four hypotheses are built into and tested by the model
developed in this section (with the exception of Hypothesis 4,
which will be explained later).
OLS multiple regression analysis is used with industry-wide
data from SIC 371 covering the 1960-1990 period. The regression
equation takes the form:
Employ* a1 + ajMktSh + a3RealWage + a4Output/Hrt + a5Unemp
The variables are defined in Table 1, and their sources are
given. Below, each variable and its expected coefficient is
explained in the context of its respective hypothesis.
TABLE 1—VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

VARIABLE

DEFINITION
Number of employees In t h e motor

Employ

vehicles and equipment industry, SIC 371
(Source: Monthly Labor Review,
various issues)

MktSh

% of the U.S. market for automobiles
held by domestic producers. Measured
by the % of new vehicle registrations
each year in the U.S. (Source: MVMA
World Motor Vehicle Data, 1990)

RealWage

Average wage of production workers in
SIC 371 divided by the CPI (Source:
Handbook of Labor S t a t i s t i c s , Business
Statistics)

Output/Hr

Average output per employee hour in
SIC 371. Measured as index with 1977=
100 (Source: Handbook of Labor
Statistics)

Unemp

Total unemployment rate in U.S. economy
(Source: Business Statistics)

Hypothesis 1
The c o e f f i c i e n t a 2 on t h e market s h a r e v a r i a b l e s h o u l d be
p o s i t i v e according to Hypothesis 1.
That i s , a s t h e s h a r e o f t h e
U . S . market h e l d b y d o m e s t i c p r o d u c e r s d e c r e a s e s , t h e demand f o r
l a b o r by domestic producers should d e c r e a s e .
This w i l l be r e flected graphically by a s h i f t to the l e f t and/or an increase in
t h e e l a s t i c i t y o f t h e demand f o r l a b o r c u r v e .
The market s h a r e
v a r i a b l e i s measured a s t h e p e r c e n t o f new v e h i c l e s r e g i s t e r e d i n
t h e U . S . t h a t were d o m e s t i c a l l y p r o d u c e d .
The o n l y shortcoming
o f t h i s measure i s t h a t i t a l s o i n c l u d e s v e h i c l e s produced i n
Illinois Wesleyan University
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foreign transplants in the U.S. If cars sold by transplants
displace imported sales, the net effect on employment in the U.S.
motor vehicle industry would be positive. However, if transplant
sales displace the sales of the Big Three (i.e.— add to the
sales of imports), employment in the U.S. auto industry will decrease (Singleton, 1992, p.23). In the latter case, the
coefficient a2 will understate the effect of loss of market share
on labor demand in the U.S. auto industry; in the former, the
effect will be overstated.
Hypothesis 2
The effects of changes in union power are measured by a
proxy, the real wage in the motor vehicle and equipment industry
(SIC 371). This should be a reasonable proxy, as union power
will be shown partly by its ability to increase wages in an
industry. However, it does fail to take into account fringe
benefits such as supplemental unemployment benefits and job
security programs negotiated for by the UAW. This exclusion may
bias the estimated coefficient a3, but its sign should still be
negative. As the UAW negotiates wage increases, the demand for
labor should fall according to basic demand for labor theory.
Since changes in union power will result in changes in the wage
elasticity of demand for labor rather than a shift in the demand
curve, the expected negative coefficient would be shown by a move
to the left along the demand for labor curve.
Hypothesis 3
Unfortunately, measures of the number of technologies used
by auto producers (such as robots or computer-aided design and
manufacturing systems) was not available for the time period of
my study. Therefore, average output per employee hour for SIC
371 is used as a proxy based on the following reasoning: As the
implementation of new technologies increases, employee
productivity or output per employee hour should increase. This
is, however, an imperfect proxy as output per hour is influenced
by things other than just changes in technology implementation.
At any rate, the sign for coefficient a4 can be either positive
or negative, depending on whether the scale or substitution effect dominates. But if a positive (negative) coefficient results, it does not mean that there is no substitution (scale)
effect. It simply means that the scale (substitution) effect is
stronger.
Hypothesis 4
Once again, this variable has fallen victim to data
availability problems. No measures of outsourcing arrangements
were available, as the auto makers and the UAW maintained this
was "private information" (from telephone conversation with Lydia
Fischer, Research Division, UAW). Neither was an acceptable
proxy found, so this variable was omitted in computer runs of the
empirical model. However, outsourcing is controlled for to a
certain extent in that the data for the other variables cover the
52
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Motor Vehicles and Equipment Industry as a whole, not just the
auto producers. In other words, changes in outsourcing
arrangements will in part be accounted for in the employment,
real wage, and output per hour variables under the "and
Equipment" part of SIC 371. Increases in outsourcing by the Big
Three should still result in a leftward shift or an increase in
the elasticity of the demand for labor curve of the auto
producers. Strong theoretical support for this argument was
given in the previous section.
Finally, the unemployment rate was included to control for
cyclical movements in employment levels in the auto industry.
Since automobiles are big ticket items, sales fall off
dramatically in economic downturns. And because the demand for
auto workers is derived from the demand for automobiles, employment will also naturally fall off during recessionary
periods. The coefficient a5 should therefore be negative—as the
unemployment rate in the economy increases, employment in the
auto industry should decrease.
IV. Results
The results of the regression equation presented in the
previous section as obtained through OLS estimation are given in
Table 2. In short, the results were generally favorable, with
the exception of the RealWage coefficient, which had the opposite
of the predicted sign. All coefficients are significant at the
.01 level, the adjusted R2 is relatively high (=.9344), and the
Durbin-Watson statistic (2.175) suggests that there are no problems with auto-correlation. The estimated coefficients and their
meanings will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Hypothesis 1 was upheld by this empirical model, as is
shown by the positive coefficient a2 for the market share
variable. Although the size of the coefficient suggests that its
effect is relatively small, it nevertheless has the predicted
effect and is significant beyond the .01 level. The market share
decreases experienced by U.S. auto makers during the 1970s and
1980s, and now into the 1990s, have indeed negatively influenced
the level of employment in the industry. The results demonstrate
that a decrease in the market share held by U.S. producers of 1%
will result in a decrease in employment of 4330 jobs (employment
varable is measured as thousands of employees). It seems then
that there is merit in the UAW's, the Big Three's, and politicians7 concerns about the increasing levels of import penetration in the U.S. automobile market, not to mention the
concerns of employees fearing for their jobs.
Skipping Hypothesis 2 for the moment, the estimated
coefficient a4 for the Output/Hr variable turned out to be
positive and significant at the .01 level. All else constant,
this coefficient suggests that an increase in technology
implementation will cause employment to increase. The scale
effect dominates, although the substitution effect may still be
present. According to this coefficient, an increase in output
Illinois Wesleyan University
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per hour of one index point (output per hour was measured as an
index with 1977=100) will lead to an increase in employment of
1540 workers.

TABLE 2—REGRESSION RESULTS
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
MktSh

COEFFICIENT

4.33
(3.51)*

RealWage

98.17
(13.59)*

Output/Hr

1.54
(2.68)*

Unemp
Constant

-36.38
(10.86)*
-568.89

(t-statistics in parentheses)
* significant at .01 level
Adjusted R-squared - .9344
Degrees of Freedom » 23
Durbin-Watson Statistic - 2.175
The unemployment rate variable also performed favorably,
with its coefficient being large, negative, and significant
beyond the .01 level. As expected, employment in the auto
industry moves with the business cycle, falling during downturns
and rising during recoveries. The inclusion of this variable was
important as it controlled for the cyclical component in the
model and allowed the other variables to predict more accurately.
Back to Hypothesis 2. The estimated coefficient a3 was
puzzling at best. It turned out to be a large positive number
that is highly significant, contradicting basic labor demand
theory. Essentially, this positive coefficient postulates an
upward sloping demand for labor curve, with an increase in the
real wage causing a large increase in employment.
While this result is disappointing, there are several
possible explanations for coefficient a3 having the opposite of
the predicted sign. The first and most obvious reason could be
that the real wage of auto workers may not be such a reasonable
measure of or proxy for union power after all. UAW power can
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also be seen by changes in the level of fringe benefits, changes
in the percent of industry employees unionized, the extent of
pattern bargaining, and changes in the amount of "domestic
content" in domestically produced automobiles. The use of a
union-nonunion wage differential variable may have given a better
estimation of union power, but such data were not available.
Looking at the graphs of auto industry employment (Figure 1) and
real wages (Figure 4 ) , it is no surprise to find a3 to be positive since both have a generally downward trend over the past ten
to fifteen years. Interestingly enough, nominal auto worker
wages (before adjusting for inflation) had the predicted negative
sign.
Second, the real wage variable may be influenced by other
variables outside the model, causing its coefficient to be
biased. For example, since the demand for auto workers is
derived from the demand for automobiles, it should be effected by
both the price of automobiles and consumers' disposable income.
Either of these might be correlated with wages, causing the wage
coefficient to pick up their effects. Similarly, the real wage
variable may actually be endogenous to the model, although it is
being represented as an exogenous variable. In other words, real
wages may actually depend on market share, output per hour, and
the unemployment rate. In this case, a more sophisticated two
stage model may be more useful.
Finally, union power may actually be a shift parameter,
rather than just causing a change in the elasticity of or a
movement along the demand for labor curve. In this case, the UAW
would operate more like a craft union, influencing both the level
of employment and the level of wages. An increase in the
negotiated real wage may be accompanied by an increase in
negotiated employment, thereby causing an outward shift in the
demand for labor curve (or what might appear to be an upward
sloping short-run demand curve). Needless to say, some work
needs to be done on this union power variable in future research
efforts.
Overall, the results of the model were favorable.
Hypothesis 1 was upheld, the technology effect was decided in
favor of the scale effect, and the unemployment rate performed
well as a control for cyclical variations. Furthermore, the
estimated coefficients were highly significant, and the adjusted
R2 was high.
V. Conclusions and Suggestions
The purpose of this paper was to explain fluctuations in
employment in the U.S. automobile industry through both
theoretical and empirical analysis. Four hypotheses of factors
effecting auto industry employment were developed through a look
at changes in the industry over the past 30 years. All four of
these hypotheses were strongly supported theoretically using
demand for labor analysis and the Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived
Demand. Three of the hypotheses were tested empirically using
Illinois Wesleyan University
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multiple regression analysis, two of which were supported and one
of which was found to contradict basic demand for labor theory.
In support of the theory were the findings that a positive
relationship exists between market share and employment in the
auto industry. This finding implies that the increasing
competition from Japanese auto producers does indeed cause
employment of U.S. auto workers to fall* Increases in technology
implementation were also found to increase employment in the
industry. This is an encouraging result in that new technologies
can be used to increase productivity and catch up to the Japanese
without displacing as many workers as might be expected. The
real wage variable was the only one that did not perform well,
with the model predicting a positive relationship between
employment and real wages. However, this variable was subject to
some problems (discussed in the previous section) that may have
influenced its estimated coefficient. Finally, the argument that
increasing outsourcing by the Big Three should decrease
employment was theoretically supported, but could not be
empirically tested due to data constraints.
Future efforts in this area should concentrate primarily on
four things:
1) a more complete and reliable measure of UAW power should
be found that takes into account fringe benefits as well as other
aspects of union power (pattern bargaining, domestic content, %
unionized, etc.). Furthermore, a two-stage model may be
appropriate to avoid the endogenous/exogenous problem of the real
wage variable;
2) a better measure of technology implementation should be
used, such as the number of robots in use, which would more
directly measure the effects of technology changes;
3) some quantitative measure of outsourcing should be used
to make the model more complete. A possibility would be the percent of domestically produced automobiles that comes from foreign
sources; and
4) a less aggregated measure of employment should be found
that would include only domestic automobile production workers
rather than employees in the entire industry (SIC 371).
However, I did find a significant relationship between
employment in the auto industry and international competition
which is consistent with economic theory. Employment was also
found to be positively effected by productivity enhancing
technologies. This seems to indicate that perhaps the best way
to head-off the adverse effects of international competition on
employment in the U.S. auto industry is to pursue policies that
will increase labor productivity. The effects of these two
variables may offset each other so that employment can be
somewhat stabilized, even in the face of a decreasing market
share for U.S. auto producers.

•
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